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The literature on the history of British capital markets has noted a divergence between 
the London as a financial centre and regional, specialist clusters of industrial firms. In 
1931, the Macmillan Committee identified a so7called ‘equity gap’, suggesting 
significant obstacles for industrial firms seeking suitably priced risk capital from 
financial markets. To some historians, the City of London continued to operate as a 
gentlemanly elite, relying on mutual trust through an over7protective old7boy 
network.
1 
The development of the venture capital industry after 1980 addressed the 
equity gap to some degree, although many argue that inaccessibility to equity markets 
and to the London markets in particular, continues today.
2
 
The reasons for this separation were apparently economically rational, at least 
to begin with. In the late nineteenth century, overseas investments, particularly large 
fixed interest bonds in mining, commodities, railways and infrastructure offered 
higher yields and lower transaction costs relative to new issues in domestic industrial 
securities.
3
 Another suggested reason for London turning away from domestic 
industrial issues was the experience of the 1890s domestic boom.
4
 New industries, 
most notably those based on the development of the pneumatic tyre, including 
bicycles and motor vehicles, formed the basis of a promotional boom that ended in 
bankruptcy and recrimination among its leading players. Controversial promoters, 
Ernest Terah Hooley and Henry Lawson, although from middling backgrounds 
themselves, famously recruited members of the aristocracy to be listed in the 
prospectus as board members of their newly listed companies.
5
 The literature has 
interpreted their use of Lords on the board either as a temporary aberration, or a 
method of systematically inflating prices, and as part of a wider scheme of fraudulent 
activity.
6
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In this paper we offer a new interpretation, suggesting that the use of Lords in 
company promotion was symptomatic of a gap that had already emerged by the 1890s 
between London as a financial centre and regional clusters of industries. Specifically, 
employing aristocrats constituted a market entry strategy for new regional industrial 
firms to gain access to London finance. The use of such a strategy was more 
necessary in the absence of underwriting or other sources of insurance or access to 
large issuing houses like Barings. Our interpretation thus regards access to social 
networks as a crucial aspect of company promotion, and the board as having a 
governance function of sustaining access to such networks. By presenting the 
historical and social dimensions of these relationships, the paper adds to the wider 
corporate governance literature on the function of boards of directors in terms of 
access to capital resources, relational capital, legitimacy and reputation.
7
  
The bicycle and pneumatic tyre industry provides a useful illustration because 
it involved a large number of firms and was at the centre of the domestic flotation 
boom in the 1890s. Evidence can therefore be triangulated between examples of 
regional firms with London listings; regional firms with regional listings, variation in 
use of aristocratic directors, and between hot and cold issue markets. In other 
industries and markets, new equity issues were more piecemeal (for example iron, 
steel, chemicals, and textile finishing based in Manchester and Sheffield). An 
exception was the brewing industry, whose firms also accessed the London market 
and in a minority of cases had board members drawn from the political establishment 
and aristocratic social networks. These board members appear to have had a positive 
effect on share price behaviour during the phase of intense political lobbying after 
1900, although the role of one firm, Guinness, seems to have been particularly 
influential.
8
 Evidence from the cycle industry therefore has the potential to 
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complement and further contextualise such relationships between board composition 
and stock exchange listing decisions.  
 In summary, our interpretation offers a potential contribution in several areas: 
First, the methods used to raise equity finance in the British economy with reference 
to the promotional methods typically used in initial public offerings (IPOs) before 
1914; second, the networking function of directors and third, the early history of the 
bicycle and pneumatic tyre industry. In the next section the literature in each of these 
areas is reviewed, leading to associated specific research questions about the role of 
aristocrats in the promotion of industrial companies. These are examined in the next 
section by the identification of a sample of firms in the bicycle, tyre and associated 
industries such that their characteristics can be systematically compared. A 
concluding section shows that aristocratic directors were a necessary requirement for 
the purposes of accessing London finance by industrial firms and that the ultimate 
failure of these methods was symptomatic of a growing divergence between the 
industrial and financial sections of the British economy. 
 

-. 	(    	 	   	 
	 


"#
$%	&
In the period before 1914, new industrial firms faced an apparent choice between 
listing their shares on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and a listing on one or more 
of several regional stock exchanges. An LSE listing offered the advantage of a deeper 
market whereas regional exchanges avoided the transaction costs associated with the 
specialised functions of brokers and jobbers in London. Regional listings also 
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mitigated information asymmetry since local knowledge of the venture, including the 
reputation of the vendor and the prospects for the business, helped ensure that new 
securities were issued at prices close to their values.
9
 
Several large sample studies have examined UK IPOs in the decades prior to 
1914 with a focus on higher status, or elite directors. In these studies, elite directors 
are typically defined as peers, politicians and military officers. There is little evidence 
that elite directors played a decisive or even positive role. They did not for example 
reduce the risk of failure of IPOs on the LSE in the period 190071913.
10
 Other 
evidence shows that the appointment of well7connected directors (either MPs or 
directors with aristocratic titles) did not increase the rate of return on English and 
Welsh banks equity during 187971909 and that M.P. directors had negative effects on 
the financial performance of bank equity, whereas directors with noble titles had no 
distinct effect.
11
  
These findings offer specific evidence in the context of the more general 
argument that the capital markets failed the British economy.  According to this view, 
lack of effective regulation meant that the market was subject to manipulation and 
failed to attract sufficient capital to secure Britain’s longer7term investment needs, 
contributing to a decline in its international position.
12
 An important reason was the 
accusation of fraud in leading cases, and, partly as a consequence, the role of lords 
and other figures of social standing was satirised by contemporary social observers.
13
  
However, it has also been suggested that it would be unreasonable to 
generalise from these cases. Indeed there were other examples, such as the Kodak 
flotation, when Eastman recruited Lord Kelvin to the board precisely because of his 
relevant technical and business experience. Voluntary regulation therefore assured 
flexibility and provided suitable incentives for companies to go public.
14
 These 
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divergences in the literature suggest the need for further empirical research into the 
rationales behind the recruitment of elite directors into the financial sector.  
 
'	

	
	
	!
Financial research that has examined the role of directors in new issues generally has 
emphasised their function in quality signalling such that the risk of failure or 
mispricing in an IPO is reduced. Signals include the reputations of directors and their 
associated managerial talent, along with the reputations of auditors, underwriters, and 
venture capitalists.
15
 The affiliation and legitimation aspects of such signals are also 
of substantial importance.
16
  
Directors’ reputation can thus provide a credible signal in some circumstances. 
Elite directors are more likely to have useful political connections. Such connections 
can enhance financial performance of newly listed firms. Conversely, in some 
context, they may send a negative signal about the likelihood of conflict of interest 
and corruption.
17
 Also, in common with other directors, elite directors may provide 
resources for the firm in terms of expertise based on specialist knowledge or business 
experience.
18
  
Even in the absence of political connections or relevant expertise, elite 
directors’ reputation may also be valuable in its own right. In the late nineteenth 
century, aristocrats were an essential element in the marketing of shares, and added 
prestige, especially if the list of names resonated with the public.
19
 Such directors 
would be reluctant to sacrifice their reputation and their social position by sitting on 
boards of poorly performing firms, and rather would try to enhance their reputation by 
associating with firms with good growth prospects and sound finances.
20
 
In the pre71914 UK new issue market context, information asymmetry was as 
severe if not more so than in modern markets. Victorian company promoters were 
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better informed about the prospects of the ventures they were selling than were the 
vast majority of potential buyers.
21
 However, access to certain networks was also 
clearly an important part of the process of financing economic activity. According to 
one survey, politically connected directors boosted the share prices of new technology 
firms, also providing greater access to external finance, both debt and equity, and 
improved profitability.
22
 Related evidence suggests that shareholdings were typically 
highly concentrated post issue,
23
 providing potentially important context for the role 
of elite directors within such ownership structures. Politically connected directors 
could allow firms to access their networks of acquaintances and establish contacts 
with bankers and possible financiers.
24
  
Aristocratic directors may have been recruited to boards for similar reasons. 
The Lords on the board, or ‘guinea7pig’ directors, phenomenon first appeared in the 
1825 company promotion boom. Following the restrictions on incorporation after the 
South Sea bubble, 1825 was the first opportunity for such a boom since 1720. Of 
course, the South Sea scheme had also utilised famous and titled individuals for the 
purposes of pushing the stock, so in that sense, nothing changed as Britain rapidly 
industrialised in the railway booms of the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s. Guinea pig 
directors also featured during the associated ‘railway mania’ through to the 
promotional booms of the 1920s.
25
 By the 1880s, as Kynaston notes: ‘the upper 
reaches of the City moved increasingly close to the traditional landed governing class, 
thereby achieving an intimate and privileged access to power denied their industrial 
counterparts in the provinces’.
26
 Provincial listings, particularly of railway and 
banking stocks, appealed to pools of investors with access to local social connections 
and information sources, whereas London especially for firms headquartered there, 
offered a larger potential secondary market with a low equity premium.
27
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An important possible reason then, why promoters like Hooley and Lawson 
might use aristocratic directors would be that they offered access to a market that 
might otherwise have been closed to provincial industrial firms. Hooley certainly 
utilised peers for their names, whom he described as ‘front sheeters’ for their 
prominent role of the first page of the prospectus in return for cash. Hooley had a 
clear idea about the value of hierarchy in the peerage in this respect and also of 
military officers and politicians.
28
 However, aristocrats were used in some cases but 
not others, with the larger London based floats apparently requiring greater 
aristocratic presence, suggesting that further empirical research might establish the 
precise circumstances in which they were needed. 
 




Company flotations in this sector have unsurprisingly attracted considerable attention 
from business and economic historians given the significance of the sector in the new 
issues market and their importance for the wider economy.
29
 Specifically, the cycle, 
tyre and related industries sector offers a useful case study for a number of reasons. 
First it represented a new sector of the economy based on newly developed and 
closely inter7related technologies introduced in the late 1880s and early 1890s with 
the opportunity for rapid potential market expansion if the needs for associated 
finance could be met. The ability to raise such finance in substantial part depended on 
patents and associated licensing agreements.  In the case of Dunlop, to effectively 
exploit such patents, the firm launched overseas subsidiaries, and also sub7contracted 
most component production to other firms, concentrating only on assembly at its 
factory in Coventry.
30
 Patents tended to become obsolete quickly as new methods 
were invented. Moreover, new firms relied upon associated investments in 
infrastructure, which in turn were at the behest of government and municipal 
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approvals.
31
 Future cash flows were therefore risky and difficult to ascertain, thereby 
increasing the potential cost of finance. Small pioneering regional firms, like Fred. 
Hopper and Co. struggled to obtain the finance required to expand their businesses.
32
 
Notwithstanding these problems, substantial equity was raised from capital 
markets. In the period c.189671914 the cycle industry raised over £14m in new share 
issues and the motor vehicle industry over £6m.
33
 There were significant booms in 
company flotations in cycles, tyres and embryonically in motor vehicles in 189671897 
and a more fully7fledged boom in motor vehicles in 190571906. In the period 18827
1914 there were 328 new share issues with an average capital raised of £64,000 
each.
34
 The boom of 189671897 was notable for the tendency to include aristocrats on 
the boards of directors, few of whom, with minor exceptions, had relevant business 
experience, some of whom were paid by Hooley in his capacity as promoter.
35
  
To summarise, there are two broad explanations of the value of aristocrats on 
the boards of IPO firms generally and those participating in the bicycle boom in 
particular. First, lords were merely nominees, with no useful business knowledge 
employed by fraudulent promoters to push mispriced shares and to overcome the 
information asymmetry problem between promoters and potential shareholders. 
Second, lords were a bridge to a social network essential for access to the London 
capital market otherwise denied by institutions preoccupied with overseas 
investments. Of course, the two explanations are not mutually exclusive and indeed 
may complement one another. However, in concentrating on the first, the above 
literature has tended to neglect the second, and so the next section introduces further 
evidence designed to shed further light on the role of aristocrats in securing market 
access. 
   
/			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To investigate these explanations a database of firms in the bicycle, pneumatic tyre 
and related industries was constructed for the period 189271897. The sector was 
defined to include firms producing bicycles, components for bicycles, pneumatic tyres 
and also motor vehicles.
36
 In total, 73 new listings were identified from (		!	
"	.  In each case the names and occupations of board members were 
obtained from the prospectus using the same source. Information concerning the 
exchange(s) on which the shares were to be listed was also obtained along with share 
price data using the London Stock Exchange (LSE) listing application Report Books, 
the share listings in national and regional newspapers.
37
  
 For the purposes of further analysis, several grouping variables were 
established. First, the sample was grouped according to the principal outcome variable 
to be explained: stock exchange listing, distinguishing between London and regional 
listings, or where firms were listed in both London and a regional exchange. In almost 
all cases (with three exceptions) firms with London listings also had quotes on 
regional markets, so for practical purposes the distinction is between regional only 
and London and regional. For this reason, it is unlikely that differential returns on 
London and regional markets were influential in the listing decision.  
The sample was also differentiated according to whether the firm formally 
applied to the LSE or the shares were listed unofficially. The main explanatory 
variable was defined as the presence of ‘lords’, based on the titles of directors listed in 
the prospectus.
38
 Further variables with the potential to explain variation in listing, 
included: product type, distinguishing between tyre and cycle/other, on the grounds 
that tyre firms were typically larger and thus required greater access to finance; 
whether or not the firm controlled a patent and therefore required greater quality 
signalling to validate cash flows forecast to arise from intangible assets; whether or 
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not additional capital was raised in the form of debentures and preference shares, with 
the expectation that London may have been a more suitable for multiple classes of 
capital; whether or not the firm had a head office in London, with the expectation that 
the convenience of geographical location may determine how finance is accessed. In 
addition, data was collected for size of issue in terms of total capital and a share price 
index was established based on all firms with regular quotations, so that individual 
firms could be compared with an industry sector index based and weighted average 
returns compared over time. The volume of issues and share prices were analysed by 
sub period to identify ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ issue markets, so that the presence or absence 
of aristocrats and other elite directors on boards in such periods could also be 
compared.  
An innovative analytical approach is used to identify the conditions that were 
necessary and sufficient for accessing London capital.  Exact logistic analysis
39
 is 
appropriate for small data samples consisting of 1/0 variables and has been used in 
other disciplines, most notably medical research, but not, to our knowledge, thus far 
in business history or related subjects. We believe this approach has potentially wide 
application in business history and other historical settings, given the common 
occurrences of small sample sizes and recourse to qualitative variables.  A further 
advantage is that systematic relationships identified using the exact logistic method 
can be supported using case studies or further qualitative evidence drawn either from 
observations confirming the larger correlation or from outliers, thereby triangulating 
the evidence and pinpointing the nature of underlying relationships. To supplement 
the above dataset, therefore, illustrative cases were also identified and investigated 
using a combination of press coverage and accounting data, allowing further 
consideration of the specific motives of the promoters and also the accuracy or 
Page 12 of 56
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fbsh
Business History
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 13
otherwise of their valuations of the underlying businesses. Taken together, these 
diverse sources allow for the triangulation of evidence, as set out in the next section. 


-			

	
			
Table 1, Panel A describes the sample distribution across the categorical variables 
used, which were in most cases evenly distributed. The exceptions were the tyre 
sector, which was small compared to cycle producers, and the relatively small number 
of firms issuing preference shares and debentures (17 and 15 respectively). Table 1, 
Panel B reports the results of the exact logistical regressions for the sample and 
variables discussed above. As table 1 shows, the presence of a lord on the board was 
the only significant predictor of the decision to apply for a London listing. A firm 
with an aristocratic director(s) was around 7.5 times more likely to seek a London 
listing than a firm without such directors.
40
 There is thus strong evidence that Lords 
were recruited to boards for the purpose of accessing London finance. To investigate 
further, the tests were repeated replacing the London stock exchange listing 
dependent variable with a similar dummy, determined by whether or not the firm was 
listed as a London quotation by the )

.  The result in this case was that 
the lord on the board variable became insignificant. To explain the difference, it 
should be that substantially more London quotations were listed in the )


 than there were cases of firms officially applying to the stock exchange 
admissions committee.
41
  The implication therefore was that the )

 was 
listing the prices quoted by unofficial London traders. In some cases these traders 
were motivated by the opportunities to arbitrage price differences between regional 
and London markets, known as “shunting”,
42
 and the appearance of quotes for firms 
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in more than one market may have reflected the extent of these opportunities. The 
change in results using this new dependent variable therefore suggests that the 
purpose of recruiting aristocrats was specifically to support the process of official 
admission to the stock exchange, rather than to offload stock to speculative dealers 
based in London or elsewhere.  

 		
 
In contrast to Lords other potential explanatory variables were consistently 
insignificant.
43
 Patents featured strongly in many prospectuses (44 out of 73; table 1), 
but as the evidence suggests these did not influence whether or not a firm applied for 
a London listing.  All 14 tyre7producing firms which were listed with quotes in the 
)

 in January 1897 were quoted in London, in contrast for example to 
tube firms, which had only 1 out of 12 firms quoted in London (with the remainder in 
Birmingham),
44
 but there was no corresponding relationship between type of product 
and the formal application for listing. Firms issuing different types of capital, 
preference shares and debentures, were not in the general case associated with 
admission to the London market. Indeed regional markets appeared to offer at least as 
much support for preference issues. For example on 2nd January 1897 the )


 listed 4 firms within the cycle sub7sector with preference shares quoted in 
London but 7 quoted in Birmingham.
45
Head office location was also insignificantly 
related to London listing applications. Another way of interpreting these results is that 
for industrial firms, regardless of asset type, production activity, or class of capital 
required, the provincial stock markets offered suitable institutional support.  
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The core hypothesis therefore remains, that the use of lords reflected linkages 
between industrialists and social networks, which, being more closely orientated to 
London, were potentially larger in scale and scope. In Table 1 panel C, the effects of 
the size of equity issues are contrasted. The results show that the average issue size 
was significantly larger for firms with Lords on the board and for firms that applied 
for London listings. Given the larger pools of capital available in London, these scale 
effects are unsurprising. Accessing London provided the opportunity to sell shares not 
just to a wider public, but also to larger and more socially elevated investors. These 
possibilities are explored further in the case study evidence presented below.  

*	
To contextualise the econometric and case study evidence, it is necessary to examine 
further the context of the share market, specifically so that any association between 
promotion methods and market conditions can be assessed. To identify the ‘hot’ and 
‘cold’ phases of the promotions market, the number of firms floated per month is 
plotted in Figure 1 using our sample of 73 firms. In the finance literature, ‘hot’ issue 
markets have been characterised as periods of relatively high volumes and where 
there is correlation between current levels of IPO initial returns and increases in future 
IPO volumes.
46
 Given our relatively small sample size, we followed the first approach 
and computed a three7month moving average for the share issues in our sample and 
defined ‘hot’ months as those where the number of new issues was in the top quartile. 
These calculations showed that apart from a minor boom in June/July1893, all ‘hot’ 
months fell in the period March 18967April 1897 inclusive.
47
  
0	
0)	
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To examine the state of the market further, figure 2 shows the pattern of share 
price movements, using an equally weighted market index of share price quotations 
for cycle and related firms. As figure 2 shows, shares in cycle firms did not appreciate 
significantly until the boom of spring 1896. In the pre boom period relatively few new 
firms were floated and these did not use aristocratic directors. Such firms were listed 
on regional stock markets, which included Dublin. For example, shares in the 
Grappler Pneumatic Tyre Company were issued on the Dublin market in May 1893.
48
 
Taken together, the pattern in figures 1 and 2 suggests that the hot market that 
commenced around March 1896 was over by April 1897. 
By this time all firms were suffering the consequences of oversupply in the 
product market. The problem was not just that too many British firms had been 
floated, but that the market was now also flooded with American imports. Vernon 
Pugh, the Managing Director of Rudge Whitworth Limited, announced 25% price 
reductions on its cycles, based on its capacity to deliver increased output, but also 
reflecting the increased saturation of the cycle market. At Easter 1897 stories had 
circulated of overstocking and inevitable price cuts. Press commentators agreed that 
the days of inflated cycle prices were numbered. ‘Profits’, according to one, ‘based in 
the prospectus on large sales and high prices, will be difficult to realise in the 
disgracefully over7capitalised concerns’.
49
  
In summary, wider market trends explain the transition from hot to cold 
market conditions for new share issues in the first half of 1897. They also provide a 
possible explanation of the secular decline in share prices after March 1897. 
Moreover, they tend to undermine the view that the hot market was a function of the 
overpricing of shares, particularly those of Dunlop, at the height of the boom in May 
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1896.  This issue is examined in more detail in the case study analysis of Dunlop and 
other leading flotations that now follows. 

'

The case study evidence concentrates first on accessing the London capital market, 
concentrating on Dunlop and other leading cases that utilised aristocratic connections. 
Second, these are contrasted with cases where firms accessed London but without 
utilising aristocrats. A third, further contrast is then made with regional floats and 
networks and the reasons why they were preferred in some cases. Fourth, this leads on 
to cases where firms accessed both London and regional networks simultaneously, 
utilising aristocrats and other groups of network influencers, exemplified by Lawson, 
and his ambition to monopolise the sector. Finally, further cases illustrate how these 
groups, notably society officials, politicians and military leaders complemented the 
involvement of aristocratic directors. Examining these contrasts allows further 
exploration of the sufficient and necessary conditions for accessing the London 
capital market 

01	
 
As the largest new issue, Dunlop, whose float on the London market, 
prominently featuring aristocratic directors, made Hooley’s name as a financier, 
provides the logical starting point for analysing the key features of the cycle boom. 
Figure 3 shows share index values for the Pneumatic Tyre Company (PTC) and the 
post flotation successor company to PTC, the Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company 
(DPTC) compared to the index for the sector as a whole. The Dunlop floatation 
Page 17 of 56
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fbsh
Business History
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 18
prompted  the sharp rise in the index in April/May 1896, which coincided with 
Hooley’s purchase of PTC and its reflotation a couple of weeks later as the DPTC. 
The spike in Dunlop shares in May 1896 suggests that, in common with previous 
interpretations of the episode, aristocrats were a convenient method of overinflating 
the shares. It is certainly true that Hooley recognised the need for publicity, as his 
memoirs stressed, and he saw aristocratic directors as a means to this end.
50
 
Contemporaries and subsequent histories suggested that Hooley performed a stroke of 
genius in buying PTC for £3m and selling it for £5m only a few weeks later.
51
  
However, this version of events is only a part of the story. PTC’s profits had 
grown rapidly at an annual equivalent rate of 133.58% between 1890 and 1896.
52
 In 
the same period, the industry growth rate was around 13%.
53
 Even so, the PTC share 
price was relatively static (figure 3). PTC shares were quoted on the Dublin market 
where they were thinly traded relative to London, and where shareholders came to 
expect profits to be paid out as dividends.
54
 The asset base of the company was, as a 
consequence, expanded in response to increased demand for its products by new share 
issues, rather than by reinvested profits. The high dividend pay7out and dilution 
through new issues explain why there was no significant long term growth in share 
value prior to 1896. The proceeds of these issues were included in PTC ‘profits’ as 
recorded in the Dunlop prospectus. Even so PTC and DPTC seem to have been fairly 
priced by Hooley.
55
 Stripping out share issue proceeds, it can be observed that Hooley 
purchased the PTC at a valuation of 13.64 times net earnings. Interim results were 
released just ahead of the DPTC issue showing an annualised equivalent increase of 
68.29% on the last full year’s profits to 1895. Bearing in mind that of the £5m total 
issue value for DPTC, £1m was in debentures, the theoretical value of post debenture 
interest profits, factoring the increase in earnings and using the PTC multiple, was 
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around £4.5m, whereas Hooley sold the company for only £4m net of debentures.
56
 
Not only that, but contemporary sources suggested that the shares were 
oversubscribed by between 8 and 15 times.
57
  
Hooley, it seemed, had under7priced the issue by a substantial margin. Such an 
outcome was surprising in view of the triumphal fanfare of publicity that greeted the 
float. Aristocratic directors had indeed assisted Hooley in creating positive publicity, 
but were not in themselves sufficient for Hooley to feel confident enough to price the 
issue in line with the growth in earnings. Indeed when full year figures became 
available, they proved that Hooley’s apparently confident extrapolation of the first 
five months results in the prospectus had also been an underestimate. The accounts to 
31
st
 March 1897 were issued on 8
th
 July 1897. They showed a profit of £592,618 
compared to an equivalent figure of £361,864 for the previous 12 months, as implied 
by the figures supplied in the prospectus, representing a 63.7% increase.
58
 
So why did Hooley under7price the issue, apparently by a substantial margin? 
For established London market operators, issues could be readily placed through 
social networks or they could take advantage of underwriting services that had been 
recently developed by financiers like H Osborne O’Hagan.
59
 As an outsider, Hooley 
did not have access to the institutional contacts required to avoid risk in such fashion. 
He therefore also partially covered his position by taking shares in the flotation 
amounting to 33,333 in each class of preference, ordinary and deferred shares, with 
his associates taking similar numbers.
60
 
Aristocratic directors no doubt helped underpin share values, in conjunction 
with these hedging strategies, but Hooley had further reasons for employing them. 
The Earl De la Warr
61
 was the conduit through whom other aristocrats were recruited 
and Hooley was able to satisfy his own narcissism and gain access to new social 
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circles and gain status.  For this reason, Hooley’s relationship with De la Warr was 
long7term, rather than purely for the purpose of being a name on the Dunlop 
prospectus.
62
 A specialist trade magazine described De le Warr as young, energetic 
and ‘go ahead’,
63
 and he remained as Chairman of the board at Dunlop for over a year 
after the issue before stepping down at the first annual general meeting in July 1897 in 
favour of Harvey Du Cros, but continued to serve on the board, as did the Duke of 
Somerset.
64
  
The longer run behaviour of the DPTC share price also suggests that the role 
of the aristocratic directors went beyond mere inflation of the issue price. Although 
Dunlop did peak in May 1896, immediately after its flotation, it is noteworthy in 
figures 2 and 3 that the index generally remained high until March 1897, and that 
Dunlop shares did not begin a secular trend downwards until June 1897, over a year 
after the original flotation. De la Warr strongly denied that his role was purely 
cosmetic in response to allegations presented by Hooley in court.
65
 Indeed it was only 
after Hooley’s bankruptcy in 1898 that recriminations began, with Hooley noting that: 
‘the immediate consequence…was that all my aristocratic friends deserted me’. He 
also pointed out that ‘…my retirement from London made a tremendous difference to 
me financially. The hundred and one different schemes in which I had been interested 
naturally had to be dropped…’
66
 The allegations that followed, of bribery, fabrication 
of evidence and the evident superficiality of the role of the aristocrats reflected the 
breakdown of relationships and have coloured the historiography of the bicycle boom 
since. 
This is not to say that Hooley was not an unscrupulous operator. Another 
tactic he favoured in some circumstances, again by way of hedging against short 
sellers, was the ‘bear squeeze’. In smaller issues that were likely to be 
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undersubscribed and thinly traded, his methods did not necessarily depend on 
aristocrats and instead involved cornering the market in shares such that speculators 
committed to shorting the issue could only fulfil their orders by paying a monopoly 
price. Hooley used this approach in the Humber Portugal flotation of 1896, so that he 
was able to extract £13 1/2 per share from bear traders who had attempted to short the 
partly called shares at their opening premium of ¼, threatening them with bankruptcy 
and making a personal profit of £32,000.
67
 Another leading case was the Bagot Tyre 
Company, where similar methods were used.
68
 In cases where relatively small 
industrial companies were floated, then, for the same reason that aristocratic directors 
were recruited to facilitate market access, the bear squeeze offered a potential 
insurance mechanism for otherwise risky floats without access to underwriting and 
institutional support. 
 Hooley’s motives for using aristocrats were also revealed by cases outside the 
cycle and related industries sector. Hooley’s introduction to a scheme to purchase the 
Chinese national debt for £16m came via Sir Robert Hart, who already had strong 
connections in that country. The China deal represented an attempt by Hooley to 
penetrate the world of high finance, and it is noteworthy that pressure on the Chinese 
government from Barings and Rothschilds, who described Hooley as ‘nothing better 
than a company promoter of low standing’, was sufficient to scupper the deal.
69
 These 
incidents indicate why Hooley and others might have sought alliances with aristocrats 
as a means of penetrating otherwise closed financial networks.  
Other contemporary promoters operating outside the cycle sector used similar 
methods to access the London financial network. Horatio Bottomley and Whitaker 
Wright,
70
 promoted fewer but typically larger firms than those promoted by Hooley 
and Lawson, but again their business model involved the use of aristocratic directors. 
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However, none of these firms were domestic industrial issues, and involved 
publishing and overseas ventures, principally in Australasia.
71
 Bottomley’s new 
publishing combine, Kegan, Paul, Trench, and Trubner, did not have direct 
aristocratic representation. Even so, the board was well populated with bankers with 
connections to junior branches of the aristocracy, holding official London government 
positions or with strong political connections.
72
 In this case, explicit aristocratic 
representation would not have added value beyond the connections of the elite 
directors already in place.  
Notwithstanding the apparent value of aristocrats, there was a second group of 
cycle boom cases where firms secured London listings without them. Their success 
was, however, down to other pre7existing forms of social connection to London 
networks. Examples included Claremont Cycle, whose board included Albert King, 
Colonial Merchant of Aldermanbury London) and New Seddon Pneumatic Tyre, 
where a large block of shares was reserved for the London and Scottish Agency Ltd.
73
 
Cycle Industries Corporation, a venture capital fund specialising in conversions of 
existing firms and offering advice on patent law recruited a board consisting of 
London based directors, including a banker, of mostly overseas firms.
74
 The Britannia 
Motor Carriage Company applied for a London listing without aristocratic 
representation, but was in any case located in London.
75
 Two other firms, the Elswick 
Cycles Company and Ixion Pneumatic Tyre Company were connected through joint 
ownership to firms that were already quoted in London. Ixion was purchased by 
Vickers as part of its acquisition of Maxim Nordenfelt, and was also located in 
London.
76
 For these firms access to London finance could be secured via existing 
connections without the need for aristocratic directors. 
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A similar utilisation of pre7existing networks, based on regional structures, is 
discernible in a third group of cycle and related industry floats, whose characteristics 
influenced whether Lords were used or not. These were are well illustrated by the 
case of Raleigh, where the influence of local financial networks resulted in a strong 
pull away from London. Hooley and Frank Bowden, the Chairman and main 
shareholder of Raleigh, were ‘mutual friends’
77
 and Bowden may have found him a 
helpful contact when he decided to restructure Raleigh using a share issue in March 
1896. Hooley deemed aristocrats unnecessary, and the reason offered was revealing. 
Giving evidence to the High Court in 1898, Hooley commented that he did not recall 
payments to directors, as they were local men and ‘not quite so expensive as London 
directors’.
78
 Not using high profile directors had subsequent advantages. Transactions 
involving Hooley’s payments to directors were scrutinised in detail for most of his 
floats, but Raleigh attracted no such attention during these hearings. 
In the meantime, Bowden needed capital to expand production, but otherwise 
distrusted outside shareholders. He issued the minimum number of shares to the 
public required under stock exchange listing rules and after the issue purchased as 
many as he could in the open market, as those he regarded as ‘speculators’ sold out.
79
 
In contrast, Bowden regarded local shareholders as ‘investors’ and appreciated that 
they were suspicious of Hooley and London speculators.
80
 Consequently, Hooley was 
not referred to in the prospectus or listing application, and the profit offered to him on 
the transaction was small.
81
 Notwithstanding the application for a special settlement 
with the LSE, Raleigh shares were subsequently quoted in Birmingham, but not 
London. Raleigh also used a local bank, Robinson’s Nottinghamshire Bank, in 
contrast to the more typical new issue which utilised national banks and their 
associated branch structure.
82
 So, although London provided short7term liquidity for 
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the Raleigh issue, regional capital was preferred, and was indeed sufficient for 
Bowden’s purposes over the longer run.  
A further example of the prevalence of regional markets over London was the 
float of the Endurance Tube and Engineering Company. It had attempted to apply for 
a London listing in May 1896, at the height of the boom, but without listing 
aristocrats on its board. The issue failed. A subsequent issue, again without 
aristocrats, led to a successful listing on the Birmingham stock exchange. Notably, the 
board of Endurance consisted entirely of directors of other Birmingham connected 
cycle firms.
83
 
  A possible explanation for the behaviour of Raleigh and Endurance was that 
local investors were better informed about business prospects and offered access to 
regional social networks. Certainly this was the case in sectors like banking and 
railways, which gave strong impetus to the emergence of regional stock markets after 
1870.
84
 Was this also true, however, for other growth sectors later in the nineteenth 
century?  
In view of the evident barrier to regional firms accessing London finance 
implied by the need to use elite directors, it is also worth exploring therefore whether 
London and regional capital markets had complementary features offered  considering 
a fourth group of cases that sought finance from both. A leading example, was the 
British Motor Syndicate (BMS), whose scale and complexity is explained by 
Lawson’s objective of monopolising the sector. Substantively launched in November 
1896, it was based on a new cluster of tyre, cycle and motor vehicle firms located in 
the West Midlands. At first sight, the syndicate appeared to have considerable 
similarity with the Hooley floats. Lawson has been commonly compared with Hooley, 
and like Hooley also used Lords as directors, as noted in the prior literature.
85
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Aristocrats on the boards of firms associated with Lawson’s network included Lord 
Norreys and Prince Ranjitsinhji on the Board of the BMS and in the subsidiary firms 
the Lords Winchilsea (New Beeston Cycle), Hawke (Humber Portugal) and Verulam 
(Accles).
86
  
However, these individuals were recruited more for their apparent celebrity 
status and network connections than their aristocratic pedigree. Norreys was President 
of the Road and Path Cycling Association and Ranjitsinhji a Cambridge student and 
famous cricketer.
87
 Winchilsea, a politician and agricultural lobbyist, founded the 
London to Brighton car race and was responsible for symbolically tearing up the red 
warning flag at a dinner at the Metropole Hotel in Brighton following the 
‘Emancipation Day’ run;
88
 an event also attended by Ranjitsinhji. Other famous 
individuals listed as directors within the BMS combine included J.J. Henry Sturmey, 
cycling publicist and founder of the Cycling Touring Club, Gottlieb Daimler 
(Daimler), the inventor of the petrol engine, H.H Griffin, secretary of the National 
Cyclists Union (Beeston Tyre Rim Co. Ltd) and the Hon. Evelyn Ellis (Daimler, 
Great Horseless and Accles [trustee of debentures], who attracted great publicity as 
the first person in England to drive a motor car.
89
 In these respects, Lawson’s network 
was already broader than Hooley’s, comprising aristocratic but other well connected 
individuals who could court publicity and generate significant lobbying power. 
Lawson’s ambition for the syndicate also meant accessing and controlling 
technical expertise.  His network went therefore notably also included inventors and 
patent holders. These included the consulting engineer Frederick R. Simms and also 
influential individuals in associated industries, for example, H.J. Mulliner and 
Thomas Robinson of the Brougham and Dunlop carriage7making firm were on the 
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boards of BMS production divisions (London Electric Cab and Great Horseless 
Carriage respectively).
90
  
A final feature of Lawson’s BMS network was the exploitation of political 
connections. Important names referred to in the prospectus of New Beeston Cycle 
were brothers Arthur and Joseph Chamberlain. The latter was one of the foremost 
politicians of the time, in Birmingham and nationally and the former a prominent 
Birmingham businessman.
91
 The brothers were also active investors in Quinton 
Cycle.
92
 Lawson had formed New Beeston to acquire Quinton
93
 and the Chamberlain 
brothers were listed as prominent Quinton shareholders, and by virtue of which, it was 
implied, endorsed the reputation of the New Beeston. Such was the interpretation of a 
correspondent to  who pointed out that such disclosure was without the 
approval of the individuals involved. Engineers and patent holders Holt and 
Beaumont objected to the BMS prospectus on similar grounds.
94
 
Lawson’s motive in exploiting such a diverse network was, in part, to generate 
positive publicity, particularly for the main float of the syndicate in November 1896. 
The BMS float attracted a barrage of criticism from the financial press, which 
undermined the issue.
95
 Press comments were scathing about the claimed value of 
intangibles and lack of supporting financial information.
96
 It is certainly true that the 
level of detail was far less than in Hooley’s Raleigh and DPTC floats.
97
  
Much more important, however, was Lawson’s stated intention to monopolise 
the nascent motor vehicle industry. The BMS was similar to a holding company, and 
had the objective of holding patents and collecting royalties from associated 
production divisions and third party licensees.
98
 Lawson’s strategy therefore went 
beyond merely accessing the London market and also attempted to draw in regional 
ownership networks. Lawson had already adopted the regional network model with 
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his involvement in the pre boom Humber and Beeston companies
99
 and the absorption 
of Quinton with the reputation and connections of the Chamberlains suited his 
purpose ideally. Aristocrats, then, were useful to Lawson for reasons beyond access to 
London financial markets. 
Bearing in mind the context of the end of the boom and a declining share 
market after March 1897 (figure 2), Lawson’s launch of the Amalgamated Pneumatic 
Tyre Company (APTC) in July 1897 offers a case study of how aristocrats remained 
important assets outside of ‘hot’ issue markets.  He formed the APTC as a merger of 
several firms, with the combination offered to London investors for £1.3m of new 
capital. The Earl De la Warr, still also a director of DPTC, headed the list. Although 
Lawson opted for a London listing, his motive in using De la Warr was not simply to 
access the market as had occurred with previous issues. Apart from De la Warr, the 
remaining directors were non7aristocratic incumbents of the merged firms.  As with 
BMS, the purpose of the APTC was to dominate the tyre industry. The firm was 
described as the ‘sister company’ to Dunlop and its strategy involved sharing the use 
of the patents to put an end to fierce competition and litigation.
100
 The new firm was 
not a success, and along with other cycle and tyre firms, experienced a slump in its 
fortunes in the latter part of 1897.
101
 In summary, as APTC and BMS illustrate, unlike 
Hooley, Lawson’s more ambitious objective of product market domination required 
promotional and financial networks that went beyond aristocratic elites, involving 
other groups of influential individuals in society, politics and the military. Using a 
final group of cases, it therefore worth examining the role of similar connections, 
beyond the Lawson network.  
The absorption of socially connected individuals at important nodes of the 
cycling network was commonly used in other cycle and related promotions. These 
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directors were sometimes well known, for example Warington Baden7Powell, a 
leading barrister and naval adventurer with celebrity status
102
 was a director of New 
Premier Cycle Company. Many others were well connected in cycling networks and 
their associated channels of publicity; examples included: William Henry Herbert, 
President of the Cycle Manufacturers Association (New Premier), John McKnight 
(Turner Pneumatic Tyre), Secretary of the Irish Cyclists Association, and Sydney Lee, 
editor of Cycle Trade Journal (Truffault).
103
  
Political connections were a similarly important feature of Lawson’s syndicate 
model, as illustrated by the Chamberlain example, but were less commonly used in 
other promotions.   Members of parliament were directors of a few firms, for example 
Star Cycle (C.E. Shaw M.P.), Rudge Whitworth and Rover Cycle (Sir Frederick 
Dixon7Hartland MP).
104
 Cases of firms with politically connected directors featured in 
specific networks for specific reasons. William Bromley7Davenport MP, who was a 
director of Elswick Cycles Company and the New Jointless Rim Company, also had a 
distinguished military career. The Elswick board included two further military 
directors (the Chairman, Captain Andrew Noble and Colonel Hans Hamilton), which 
was perhaps unsurprising. Noble was previously the managing director of Lord 
Armstrong’s armaments factory at Elswick, Newcastle.
105
 As a consequence perhaps, 
the Elswick cycle firm did not need to go further and recruit aristocrats to secure 
access to London capital markets.  
Other firms’ prospectuses featured military connected directors, for example 
New Premier (Warington Baden Powell and Col. C.E. Macdonald), and Anglo 
Swedish (Cols. Cox and Fred. Hill),
106
  and in several other cases they served 
alongside other directors who were aristocrats. Examples included Swift Cycle (Lord 
Randolph Churchill and Major Walter Segreave), Howe Cycle and Sewing (Sir 
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Edward Sullivan and Major General William Barwell–Barwell), Pneumatic Tube 
Machine (Earl of Norbury and Maj Gen Henderson), and Clipper Pneumatic Tyre 
(Lord Raglan and Lt Col. Seymour Blaydes).
107
 The board of Bagot Pneumatic Tyre 
consisted entirely of aristocrats and military officers.
108
 The general rule, as in the 
Lawson network, was that politicians and more especially military figures 
complemented aristocrats, although they were much less prevalent. 
    
'
The grouping of cases in the above analysis reveals some useful comparisons 
(illustrated by a typical example). In general, the evidence supports the conclusion 
from the econometric analysis that, an aristocratic connection was vital for regional 
industrial firms seeking access to the London capital market (Dunlop). Exceptions to 
this rule demonstrated circumstances where such connections were necessarily 
immaterial: firms which had pre7existing alternative connections to London 
(Claremont) and cases where regional firms consciously turned away from London 
either as a result of a failed issue (Endurance) or as a means of retaining more local 
control (Raleigh). Other large floats had ambition for monopolising the product 
market and assembled large hybrid networks based in London and the regions, 
comprising aristocrats but also celebrities, inventors and technicians, politicians, 
military leaders (BMS), regardless of whether or not there was a ‘hot’ market for new 
issues (APTC). Unlike aristocrats, who were essential for accessing London in the 
absence of pre7existing alternatives, these other classes of individual were never 
sufficient for such purpose in their own right, but did play a complementary role 
(Swift).  
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These roles are also illustrated by the results of our econometric analysis, 
which reveals that aristocrats were specifically valued by promoters of larger firms 
seeking formal approval for official quotation or special settlement from the London 
Stock Exchange. Aristocratic directors dramatically improved the probability of 
success for firms seeking formal access to the London stock exchange. They were less 
important for firms with an informal London listing, suggesting that unofficial 
London quotes reported in the financial press for some regional firms mostly reflected 
telegraphic shunting operations by brokers. Taken together, the econometric results 
and case evidence provides strong support to the alternative interpretation: that 
aristocrats provided access to a financial network that would otherwise be closed to 
regional industrial firms.  
The prevailing view hitherto, that aristocrats had no useful economic function, 
can be traced to the events and recriminations immediately after the boom and the 
collapse of Hooley’s financial schemes. It is noteworthy that although Hooley faced 
the bankruptcy court two years after the Dunlop float, the Public Prosecutor took no 
further action to investigate misdemeanours identified by the Official Receiver. 
Lawson, by contrast, was convicted in 1904 and sentenced to a year’s hard labour.
109
 
Undoubtedly many of Hooley’s practices were questionable, and the real reason that 
he escaped prosecution was his threat to disclose further information about his 
dealings with members of the social elite.
110
  
  Although the cover up protected specific individuals, the role of aristocrats in 
general dominated the post boom narrative. In considering further legislation to 
prevent recurrence, Lord Russell, the incoming Lord Chief Justice commented that 
through recent scandals, the law of limited liability had been brought into disrepute. 
An important problem, according to Russell’s analysis, was overcapitalisation, where 
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an ‘excessive price is obtained from the outside investor’ assisted by the use of 
directors who provided only ‘worthless names and titles’, and ‘no knowledge of 
business’ or ‘strength of government’. Russell argued that directors should not receive 
payment from promoters and that this or similar conflicts of interest that might 
prevent their exclusive service to shareholders should be disclosed.
111
 
The evidence in this paper suggests that Russell’s conclusion is worthy of 
some reinterpretation. The names and titles were worthless indeed as far as 
contributing to inflated share prices were concerned. Aristocrats appeared on boards 
in ‘cold’ as well as ‘hot’ issue markets and did so in some cases outside the notorious 
promotional syndicates of Hooley and Lawson. Comparing hot and cold issue markets 
also shows that Hooley’s valuation of Dunlop in May 1896 reflected industry 
realities, rather than an artificially inflated value based on the reputation of 
aristocratic directors. Market efficiency was thus not compromised by any systematic 
mispricing of the apparent value of aristocrats. The valuation ratios at the height of 
the boom were reasonable in the light of profits and profit growth at the time and 
were sustained for nearly a year after the floats. Subsequent overproduction was the 
problem rather than initial overvaluation. Even after the cycle bubble burst, aristocrats 
were used nonetheless in the BMS and APTC cases, to assist amalgamation with a 
view to monopolising the trade. 
Aristocrats were valuable then, not just in terms of the correlation between 
social status and a sustainable share price, but as a means of accessing London based 
financial networks and promoting financial restructuring aimed at securing scale and 
market dominance. Moreover, the scope of their connections was certainly greater 
than suggested in the prior literature. In his detailed review of aristocratic directors, 
Harrison, notes that ‘only Albemarle and Norreys could claim any prior connection 
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with the cycle and tyre trades’.
112
 The evidence presented above shows that there 
were many other previously undocumented important dimensions, and that aristocrats 
were part of a deeper web, based in part on leading roles in nationally significant 
clubs and societies associated with the cycle and pneumatic tyre industries. 
Furthermore, they often enjoyed celebrity status beyond their mere title, or were in 
social networks that connected them to celebrities. Non7aristocratic celebrities were 
used for similar reasons. In addition to aristocrats and celebrities, promoters also 
recognised the value of including technical experts and patentees in their business 
networks. They provided promoters with access to further positive publicity, which in 
turn created a potentially positive response from investors.  
Even in the Hooley floats, aristocrats played a positive role. Some of them, 
like De la Warr persisted in their managerial and entrepreneurial roles, and were more 
than merely ‘front sheeters’ or ‘guinea pigs’. For a narcissistic personality like 
Hooley, the specific benefits included social status and access to high society. More 
importantly, because the promotional methods used in terms of information included 
and excluded in the prospectus helped undermine investors’ perceptions, the effect 
was to further alienate the London market from industrial finance.
113
  
 The social barriers symptomatic of this estrangement were of wider 
significance for several reasons. First, they represented a potential problem for 
industrial firms large enough to aspire for a London listing. Social connections were a 
necessary condition before the bicycle boom, and made all the more difficult to 
achieve as a consequence of it. In the interim, the problem was not serious where 
issues were of modest scale and could be handled by regional stock exchanges. 
However, rising returns to scale in industrial firms, increases in capital requirements 
in regional clusters and limitations on adjacent pools of capital risked the emergence 
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of a longer run constraint on economic growth. Second, the employment of aristocrats 
to gain access to a market can be seen in terms of a transaction cost of doing business, 
more easily payable in the absence of underwriting costs. 
Until these alternatives were developed in the twentieth century, aristocratic 
directors offered a resource role in terms of access to capital and social networks, 
rather than an overly reputational role in terms of signalling to the market. Even so, 
further research could also examine the post IPO impact of aristocratic directors, in 
terms of short run mispricing and their effects on longer run financial performance in 
these industries, thereby complementing the wider literature on elite directors during 
this period.Further research is also necessary to explore the pattern of elite directors’ 
relational functions beyond the bicycle and related industries, particularly as the 
equity gap began to open in the years before the Macmillan Report of 1931. Certainly, 
aristocrats continued to feature in promotional booms in the 1920s, even though as a 
social class, the aristocracy gained no real benefit from the earlier bicycle boom, 
either in terms of reputation, or in terms of finding a new role in industry. As a 
consequence, aristocrats were more likely to nurture financial connections than 
become industrialists. On the other hand, for motives not just of social status, but also 
for the purposes of accessing finance, industrialists continued to aspire to be 
aristocrats and to join their social networks.
 
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)

5!, 
p.173. Hooley described Bottomley and Wright respectively as colleagues and 
acquaintances (Hooley, '	
	
, 293, 241). 
71
 Examples of firms promoted with aristocratic directors by Bottomley were the 
Hansard Publishing Union and the West Australian and New Zealand Market Trust; 
Wright promoted the London and Globe Finance Corporation. See respectively, 
)

, 6
th
 April, 1889, 24
th
 July, 1897, Mouat, “Whitaker Wright”, 136. 
72
 For example Coleridge J Kennard was a former member of parliament, Deputy 
Lieutenant of London, and Justice of the Peace (Mosley, (!2 ", vol.1, 
1560). 
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73
 (		!	"	, Beeston Pneumatic Tyre Company, 26
th
 June, 1893, 
68. 
74
  (		! 	 "	, The Cycle Industries Corporation, 13
th
 May, 1896, 
176. One of the firms it acquired, and which subsequently failed, was F. Hopper and 
Co.; Harrison, “F. Hopper and Co.”, 4. 
75
 At John Ward’s carriage works, Tottenham Court Road, London ( (		! 	
"	Jan7June 1896, p.200) 
76
 The Ixion Tyre Company prospectus listed as directors Hiram S. Maxim, Albert 
Vickers and George G. Hunt of the Britannia Iron Works, London;  (		! 	
"	, 9
th
 May, 1896, 1597160. "546, Friday, June 5, 1896. 
77
 Lloyd Jones et al., "	
, 31 
78
 “Mr Hooley’s affairs”, The Standard, 2
nd
 August, 1896. 
	0, 5
th
 
August, 160. 
79
 GH Report Books, MS29797/11,Raleigh Cycle Co., 120; “Raleigh Cycle 
Company”, 1	
3

"	, 16
th
 October, 1900. 
80
 Lloyd Jones et al., "	
, 16, 36737. 
81
 (		!	"	, Raleigh Cycle Company, 7
th
 March, 1896, 60; GH 
Report Books, MS29797/11,Raleigh Cycle Company, 120. The capital floated was 
£200,000 capital, the company having been sold to Hooley for £180,000 (“Hooley’s 
affairs”, *
, 2
nd
 August, 1898. 
82
 The most commonly used banks in our sample were Lloyds and London and 
Midland. Prospectuses typically referenced the London and Birmingham branch 
addresses of these banks. (		!	"	, Raleigh Cycle Company, 7
th
 
March, 1896, 60; and . 
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83
 “Try Again”, "546, 27
th
 June 1896.(		!	"	, The 
Endurance Tube and Engineering Company, 26
th
 June, 1896, 338. 
84
 Campbell et at, “The rise and decline of provincial stock markets”; railways see: 
Broadbridge, “The Sources of Railway Share Capital”; Campbell and Turner, 
“Dispelling the Myth of the Naive Investor”; Reed, “Railways and the Growth of the 
Capital Market”; regional joint stock banks, see: Acheson and Turner, “Investor 
Behaviour in a Nascent Capital Market”, Newton, “The Birth of Joint7Stock Banking’ 
Turner, “Wider Share Ownership?” 
85
 Harrison, “Joint7stock Company Flotation”; Robb, ,	, 1047106.  
86
 (		!	"	, BMS, 30
th
 November 1896, 2847285; New Beeston 
16
th
 June 1896, 2947295; Humber Portugal, 12
th
 October, 1895, 173; Accles, 3
rd
 June, 
1896, 249. 
87
 ‘BMS, (		!	"	30
th
 November 1896, 2847285;Nicholson, 
(	(5		', 466) 
88
  So called in celebration of the removal of the warning red flag and lifting of the 4 
m.p.h. speed limit (Richardson (		
, 16). Lawson’s success in the 
event was referred to in the BMS prospectus, published shortly afterwards.
(		!	"	, BMS, 30
th
 November 1896, 2847285. 
89
 Death of Lord Winchilsea. , Thursday, 8 September 1898, 6.  Mr. Henry 
Sturmey , Friday, 10th Jan. 1930, 14. ((		!	"	),  
90
 British Motor Syndicate, (		!	"	Jul7Dec 1896, 30
th
 
November, 2847285; Richardson (5		
, 18) 
91
 Jones, “Public pursuit or private profit”, 240. 
92
;(
."	 17
th
 October, 1894. 
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93
 Purchased for cash £8 6s 8d per £5 share by the Beeston Syndicate, )


  5
th
 May, 1896, 6. 
94
 Smith Pinsent and Co., solicitors, ‘New Beeston cycle company’: 5, , 18
th
 
June, 1896, W. Worby Beaumont, 5	

"	, 1
st
 December, 7; Henry Holt, ‘A 
disclaimer’, )

, 1
st
 Dec, 1896, 4.  
95
  Kynaston, '	 	
	
, 147 
96
 “City notes”. "546 28th Nov. 1896; “British Motor 
Syndicate”. 3	
	  28th Nov. 1896, 1569 
97
 (		!	"	, Raleigh Cycle Company, 7
th
 March, 1896, 60, and 
DPTC, 11
th
 May, 1896, 1637170. 
98
 The prospectus stated that objective of the syndicate was ‘to obtain a complete 
monopoly…of all motor car patents deemed of any value’,(		!	
"	, BMS, 30
th
 November 1896, 285. On the inter7relationships between the 
Lawson companies, see Lewchuk,80
	'9 7. 
99
 (		!	"	 Claremont Cycle Company, 17
th
 June, 1896, 298; 
Beeston Pneumatic Tyre was an example of an early pre boom London float, 
promoted by Lawson, featuring aristocratic directors (Lord Henry Fitzgerald), patent 
holders/inventors (Thomas Humber) and also military (Lt Col. Chas Hill, JP, 
Coventry ((		!	"	, Beeston Pneumatic Tyre Company, 26
th
 June, 
1893, 68769).
100
 *
, 16
th
 August, 1897; “Formation of a sister company to the renowned 
“Dunlop’”,  *
, 14
th
 August, 1897. The combination consisted of the 
Beeston, Turner, Woodley, Scott’s Standard pneumatic tyre companies. 
101
 3	
	, 4
th
 January, 1899, 47. 
102
 Jeal, (
"	, 20721 
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103
 (		!	"	, New Premier Cycle Company, 2
nd
 July 1896, 173 
Turner Pneumatic Tyre Co. 3
rd
 June 1893, 57, Dunlop Truffault Cycle and Tube 
Manufacturing Company, 16
th
 May, 1896, 187.  
104
 (		!	"	Star Cycle Company, 14
th
 August, 1896, 345, Rudge 
Whitworth, 175 November 1894, 77; Rover Cycle Company, 15
th
 June, 1896, 290.  
105
 (		!	"	, The Elswick Cycle Company, 5
th
 June 1896, 2567
258; Conte7Helm, -

1	3	3

, 26. 
106
 (		!	"	, New Premier Cycle Company, 2
nd
 July 1896, 173; 
Anglo Swedish Steel Tube Company, 23rd November 1896, 2677268, , 
107
 (		!	"	, Swift Cycle Company, 11
th
 December, 1896, 217; 
Howe Cycle and Sewing Machine Company, 28
th
 July, 1896, 1137115, Pneumatic 
Tube Machine Company, 3
rd
 April, 1897, 1407142; Clipper Pneumatic Tyre 
Company, 15
th
 March 1897, 103. On the Swift Cycle group of firms and Randolph 
Churchill, see Kimberley, '	
2		. 
108
 (		!	"	, Bagot Pneumatic Tyre Company, 4
th
 October, 1896: 
201, listed the directors as the Earl of Aylesford, Lord Raglan, Col. Keyser, Lt Col. 
Blaydes and Capt. Bagot. A Frenchman, M. Ernest Cuenod, the Paris delegate of the 
Touring Club of France, was listed as due to join the board post floation.  
109
 Taylor, (			*
, 255. 
110
 Anon.,  /		 (		!, 1507152, cited several press commentators who drew 
this conclusion, for example in the . '	
, and )
 -	
. A 
* 


 correspondent wrote: “Now, no august names will be 
endangered, and…all risk of further prosecutions arising out of awkward revelations 
is at an end”, , 152. 
111
 , 10
th
 November, 1898, 7. 
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112
 Harrison, “Joint7stock Company Flotation”, 174. 
113
 Kynaston,  ' 	  	
	
, notes several features of the problematic 
relationship between industry and the City that ensued from the Hooley and Lawson 
episodes, p.148. 
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Figure 2: Cycle and related industries share price index, 1893-1898
Cycle market index
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Figure 3: Dunlop share price index, 1893-1898
Pneumatic Tyre Co. Dunlop (DPTC) Cycle market index
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